“身体自身的理由”与“理由的逻辑空间”——论罗伯特·汉那对麦克道尔强概念论的批判

“The Body’s Own Reasons” and “The Logical Space of Reasons”: On Robert Hanna’s Critique of McDowell’s Strong Conceptualism

罗伯特汉那立足于当前分析哲学内部关于“知觉经验的内容是否是概念性的”这一核心讨论,尤其针对以麦克道尔为代表的强概念论主张,指出有一些知觉状态的内容甚至在本质上都不能被概念化,他把这种内容称为“本质性非概念性内容”。他认为这种自发的非概念性内容有其自身的规范性,它构成了“身体自身的理由”,并可以成为“理由的逻辑空间”的基础。与此同时,针对麦克道尔借用康德哲学来支撑其概念论主张的做法,汉那对康德作了强的非概念论解读。汉那正确地揭示了康德直观理论的困境,但他过分强调直观的独立作用,从而对康德哲学作了片面化理解,他无法解决直观和概念的真正结合问题,也无法真正成功应对麦克道尔强概念论的挑战。

Basing on the central debate over whether the content of perceptual experience is conceptual or not in contemporary analytic philosophy,especially arguing against McDowell’s strong conceptualism,Robert Hanna shows that there are perceptual states whose representational content cannot even in principle be conceptual,and he calls the content essentially non-conceptual content.According to Hanna,the autonomous non-conceptual content is inherently normative,it expresses“the body’s own reasons”,and constitutes the substructure of Sellars’s“logical space of reasons”.At the meanwhile,contrary to McDowell’s strong conceptualist reading of Kant,Hanna argues for a kind of Kantian non-conceptualism.Although Hanna is right to show the true difficulties in Kant’s theory of intuition,he cannot resolve the problem of how intuitions relate to concepts,so he cannot deal with the challenge of conceptualism successfully,because of his overemphasizing the independence of Kant’s intuition.