关系专用性投资的机会主义效应与治理机制研究——一个独立和互补的调节模型

Relationship-Specific Investment’s Opportunism and Governance Mechanism——An Independent and Complementary Moderating Model

从强形式机会主义和弱形式机会主义的双重视角,剖析合作创新中关系专用性投资的机会主义效应,探究明确型合同和关系型规范对机会主义效应的独立和互补治理作用。研究结果表明,在合作创新活动中,关系专用性投资不仅会引发强形式机会主义,也会引发弱形式机会主义;明确型合同对强形式机会主义的治理作用更显著,关系型规范对弱形式机会主义的治理作用更显著;明确型合同与关系型规范具有互补性,与单独使用一种治理机制相比,二者同时采用对机会主义效应的治理作用更显著。研究结论从深层次上揭示了合作创新中关系专用性投资的机会主义效应,以及明确型合同和关系型规范2种治理机制的独立和互补作用。

From the perspectives of strong-and weak-form opportunism,it tried to probe the relationship-specific investment’s opportunism and analyze the independent and complementary role played by explicit contracts and formal norms to curb the opportunism.The result shows that relationship-specific investment has a significantly positive effect on both strong-and weak-form opportunism.Explicit contracts have a more significantly negative moderating effect on the relationship between relationship-specific investment and strong-form opportunism than relational norms.Thus,relational norms have a more significantly negative moderating effect on the relationship between relationship-specific investment and weak-form opportunism than explicit contracts.Explicit contracts and relational norms are complementary to each other to some extent.Compared to using the two governance mechanisms separately,the moderating effect of explicit contracts in together with relational norms on the relationship between relationship-specific investment and strong-or weak-form opportunism is more significant.It reveals relationship-specific investment’s opportunism and the special governance function of explicit contracts and relational norms in depth.