环境保护型政府性基金虚报冒领行为演化博弈分析——以废弃电器电子产品处理基金为例

Analysis on the Behavior of False Report and False Claim of Environmental Protection Government Funds Base On Evolutionary Game——Taking Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment Fund as an Example

为探讨环境保护型政府性基金安全问题,选取了废弃电器电子产品处理基金为例,运用演化博弈的方法,分析了基金补贴的虚报、冒领行为。分析结果表明:由于补贴标准较高、抽查频次较少等原因,废弃电器电子产品处理基金的虚报、冒领行为具有演化稳定策略,这与当前实际情况相符。要保障基金安全,加大查处力度和设置合理标准都十分重要。政府应结合环境保护型政府性基金特点,定期开展绩效评估,根据评估结果优化基金配置,确保基金用在环境保护的“刀刃”上。

In order to discuss the safety of environmental protection government funds,selected the Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment(WEEE)Fund as an example.Using the method of evolutionary game,analyzed the behavior of false report and false claim of fund subsidies.The results showed that due to the high subsidy standards and the low frequency of random inspections,the behavior of false report and false claim of the WEEE fund has an evolutionary stability strategy.This is consistent with the current situation.To ensure the security of the fund,it is very important to increase the intensity of investigations and set reasonable standards.The government should conduct performance evaluations on a regular basis in conjunction with the characteristics of environmentally-friendly government funds,optimize fund allocation according to the evaluation results,and ensure that the fund are used in the“blade”of environmental protection.