产权性质、高管员工薪酬差距与企业风险承担

Enterprise Equity Character,Executive Compensation Gap and Enterprise-Risk Bearing

以2009年至2018年沪深A股上市的非金融类公司15943个观测值为样本,运用Stata15.0软件和多元回归模型对高管员工薪酬差距与企业风险承担水平进行实证研究,并在区分产权性质后对两者的关系进行检验;进一步地,考察公司内外部治理机制对高管员工薪酬差距和企业风险承担关系的治理作用。结果表明,高管员工薪酬差距越大,企业的风险承担水平越低,并且在国有企业中这一现象更为显著;在内部治理中,独立董事制度、高管持股等可以对高管员工薪酬差距与企业风险承担水平的负向关系起到正向调节作用;在外部治理中,市场监督较为健全的地区和产品竞争性较强的行业,高管员工薪酬差距对企业风险承担水平的负向作用得到了有效的缓解。本文的研究成果不仅为高管员工薪酬差距、企业风险承担的研究提供理论上的补充,并为企业完善治理机制以提高风险承担水平提供建设性的建议。

Taking the listed non-financial companies in Shanghai and Shenzen stock exchange market from the year 2009 to 2018 as sample,there are 15943 observations,using Stata15.0 software and multivariate regression models processing executive compensation gap and enterprise risk bearing level in our empirical research,the article distinguishes the nature of property rights,executive and employee compensation gap's influence of state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises on the enterprise risk bearing level.Further,how internal and external corporate governance affects the compensation gaps.Respectively the articles further tests the effects from internal governance mechanism,the board size,the proportion of independent directors,the executives shareholding and interaction of executive compensation gap and corporate external governance mechanism,market supervision,product market competition,the short selling mechanism and interaction of the executive compensation gap,the relationship between enterprise internal and external governance mechanism for executive employee compensation gap and the relationship between enterprise risk management function.The results show that the larger the compensation gap between senior executives and employees is,the lower the level of enterprise risk bearing is,and this phenomenon is more significant in state-owned enterprises.Furthermore,in the internal governance,the independent director system and the executive shareholding can play a positive regulating role in the negative relationship between the executive compensation gap and the enterprise risk bearing level.In other words,the higher the proportion of independent directors,the higher the proportion of senior executives'shares,and the more significant the positive regulating effect.In the external governance,in regions where market supervision is relatively more developed and industries where product market competition is relatively larger,the negative effect of the compensation gap between senior executives and employees on enterprise risk taking level has been effectively alleviated.The research results of this article not only provide theoretical evidence of the compensation gap between senior executives and employees and enterprise risk taking,but also provide constructive suggestions for enterprises to improve the governance mechanism and the level of risk taking.