我国保障房违规转租的博弈与治理机制研究

Study on Game and Governance Mechanism of Illegal Sublease of Chinese Indemnificatory Housing

在我国保障性住房长期供不应求的背景下,违规转租问题严重危害了社会公平,加剧了低收入群体"住房难"的问题。通过构建保障房拥有者与政府之间的不完全信息动态博弈模型,探究保障房违规转租的成因和治理机制。通过博弈分析发现,保障房违规转租的主要原因有:政府的惩罚力度较低、较高的市场房租带来较高的租金利差、保障房所在地区生活成本较高。据此,提出以下政策建议:一是加强对违规转租的惩治;二是加强对房地产租赁市场的监管;三是进一步完善保障房配套设施。

Under the background of China’s long-term short supply of indemnificatory housing,the problem of illegal sublease seriously endangered social equity and exacerbated the housing problem of low-income groups.In order to explore the causes and the governance mechanism of the illegal sublease of indemnificatory housing,this paper constructed a dynamic game model of incomplete information between the owner of the indemnificatory housing and the government.Based on game analysis,the results showed that there were three main reasons for the illegal sublease:The government had low punishment for illegal sublease,the high market rent brought high rent spread,and the cost of living was high in the area of indemnificatory housing.This paper put forward three suggestions that it was vital to strengthening the punishment for illegal sublease,strengthening the supervision of the real estate leasing market,and improving the supporting facilities of indemnificatory housing.