代建单位机会主义行为识别的案例研究

A Case Study on Opportunistic Behavior Identification of Agent Construction Units

实行代建制模式是我国政府投资体制改革的重要内容,可以提高政府投资效率,提升项目建设质量。但在实践中,由于与项目相关的信息不对称、政府监管缺失、民间代建单位过分追求自身利益等原因,时常会发生机会主义行为,损害政府形象和社会公众利益。因此,识别出代建单位的机会主义行为并加以抑制,是提高政府投资代建制项目管理绩效亟待解决的问题。本文以13个具有典型性的代建制项目为研究对象,以委托代理理论和交易成本理论为指导,运用探索性多案例研究方法,识别出代建单位在代建制实际运作过程中表现出的虚假中标、怠工拖延及串联合谋三种机会主义行为;描述了机会主义行为的表现形式,并提出了相关的对策建议。希望研究结论可以为政府相关主管部门制定政策提供一些参考。

The implementation of agent construction system is an important part of the Chinese government investment system reform,which can improve the efficiency of government investment and the quality of project construction.However,in practice,due to the information asymmetry related to the project,lack of government supervision,the excessive pursuit of their own interests and other reasons,civil agent construction units often engage in opportunistic behaviors,damaging the image of the government and public interests.Therefore,it is urgent to identify and curb the opportunistic behaviors of agent construction units to improve the management performance of government-invested agent construction projects.This paper takes thirteen typical agent construction projects as the research objects,with the exploratory case study method used to identify the three opportunistic behaviors of agent construction units in the actual operation of the construction agent system:False bidding,go-slow delay and serial collusion.It describes the manifestation of opportunistic behavior and provides some related suggestions.It can provide guidance for relevant governments to formulate policies on administering public infrastructure projects.