董事高管责任保险与审计费用增加:监督、激励还是纵容?——基于中国A股经验数据的实证研究

Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance and Audit Fees Increase:Supervision,Incentives or Indulgence? An Empirical Study Based on the Data of Chinese A-Share

董事高管责任保险的引入引起审计费用显著增加,既可能是监督、激励效应所致,也可能是机会主义行为所致,研究清楚到底是哪一种原因导致审计费用增加,对认识董事高管责任保险的治理职能、加强公司治理机制建设等均具有重要意义。基于沪深交易所上市公司2003—2017年的数据,实证检验了董事高管责任保险对审计费用的影响。研究发现,董事高管责任保险的引入将显著增加上市公司的审计费用支出,且审计费用支出的增加是因为保险人积极履行监督行为、追求更高的审计质量所引起的,而非是其引致的机会主义行为所导致的。进一步研究发现,董事高管责任保险与审计费用之间存在显著的正向交互效应,即在较差的外部治理环境中董事高管责任保险的监督激励效应更为显著。这一研究对董事高管责任保险与审计费用的关系有了全新的认识,也为董事高管责任保险的推广提供了经验支持。

The directors’and officers’(D&O)liability insurance will lead to a significant increase of audit fees,which may be the result of supervisory effect,incentive effect or opportunistic behavior,and it is of great significance to find out exactly what causes the increase of audit fees.Based on the data of Chinese listed companies from 2003 to 2017,the paper empirically tested the relationship between D&O and audit fees.The study found that D&O would significantly increase the audit fees,and the increased audit fees was caused by insurers’pursuit of higher audit quality because of their active supervision behavior,not by opportunistic behavior caused by D&O.Further research found that there was a significant positive interaction influence between D&O and audit fees,which showed that supervisory and incentive function of D&O was more significant in poor external governance environment.The study provided a new understanding of the relationship between D&O and audit fees,and also provided empirical support for the promotion of D&O.