期刊文献+

政府规制下废旧电子产品回收渠道的演化博弈分析 被引量:2

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Recycling Channel of Waste Electronic Products under Government Regulation
下载PDF
导出
摘要 随着科技的进步,废旧电子产品更新换代速度加快,废旧电子产品流入非正规回收渠道,不仅给正规回收渠道带来较大的竞争,还对环境构成较大的威胁,也造成一定程度的资源浪费。基于演化博弈理论,构建了政府规制下废旧电子产品回收渠道选择的动态博弈演化模型,得出博弈双方不同行为策略下的收益,研究微小扰动对该动态系统的干扰情况,并用Matlab软件仿真分析不同参数对企业选择正规回收渠道的影响。结果表明:政府的激励机制和处罚机制,对于企业选择正规回收渠道处理废旧电子产品以及不正规回收企业重新构建逆向物流系统均有积极作用。 With the progress of science and technology,the speed of renewal and replacement of waste electronic products is accelerating,and waste electronic products flow into informal recycling channels,which not only brings greater competition to the formal recycling channels,but also poses a greater threat to the environment,and also causes a certain degree of waste of resources.Based on evolutionary game theory,this paper constructs a dynamic game evolution model of waste electronic products recycling channel selection under government regulation,obtains the benefits under different behavior strategies of both sides of the game,studies the interference of small disturbances on the dynamic system,and simulates and analyses the influence of different parameters on enterprises'choice of formal recycling channel with Matlab software.The results show that the incentive mechanism and punishment mechanism of the government have a positive effect on enterprises to choose formal recycling channels to deal with waste electronic products and rebuild reverse logistics system for informal recycling enterprises.
作者 樊相宇 刘昱莹 武小平 FAN Xiangyu;LIU Yuying;WU Xiaoping(Modern Post College,Xi'an University of Posts&Telecommunications,Xi'an 710061,China)
出处 《物流科技》 2020年第3期70-77,共8页 Logistics Sci-Tech
基金 陕西省教育厅自然科学基金项目“不确定视角下快递企业末端配送优化策略研究——以西安市为例”(18JK0705)
关键词 废旧电子产品 演化博弈 回收渠道 稳定演化策略 waste electronic products evolutionary game recycling channel stable evolutionary strategy
  • 相关文献

参考文献10

二级参考文献125

共引文献170

同被引文献9

引证文献2

二级引证文献1

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部