索萨的德性知识论与儒家“正名”论的对话——兼论汉语哲学与分析哲学结合的可能性

A Dialogue between Sosa’s Virtue Epistemology and a Confucian Theory of the Rectification of Names——Also on the Posibility of the Combination of Chinese-Speaking Philosophy and Analytic Philosophy

美国哲学家索萨的德性知识论,与儒家的德性论颇有相似之处,因此,建立一种兼具二者资源的联合哲学立场,并非是缘木求鱼。而儒家在这种联合立场的锻造中所能够作出的贡献,便是解释为何德性知识论对于"盖提尔反例"的处理方案,能够在不引入"反思性知识"的前提下,仅仅依赖认知主体的直觉加以执行。说得更具体一点,儒家对于这个问题的解释将诉诸一种对于孔子"正名"论的现代重构,而这种重构亦将高度依赖东汉许慎的"六书"理论。此将说明:在汉语哲学的场域中,亚命题层面上的意义单位的彼此融合,究竟是如何为信念本身的证成提供支撑的。

Bearing considerable affinities with the Confucian notion of virtues in many aspects notwithstanding,Sosa’s virtue-epistemology-based approach to a satisfactory solution of the Gettier Problem still owes readers a further account of why aptness in Gettierized-counterexample-immune knowledge attributions will not involve reflective knowledge,the achievement of which is more psychological-resource-consuming than that of animal knowledge.By contrast,the Confucian notion of the rectification of names provides a better account of how an apt knowledge attributor can use his animal knowledge alone to handle the Gettier cases within a bigger framework of Sosa’s virtue epistemology.Since this Confucian notion looks so natural when Chinese is taken as the working language of doing epistemology,this research also shows the potential capacity of Chinese for handling contemporary philosophical issues.