直接控股股东持股与股价崩盘风险——基于过度投资和现金分红的中介效应

The Relationship between Controlling Shareholder’s Shareholding and Stock Price Crash Risk: Mediation Effect Based on Over-Investment and Cash Dividends

在现有股东持股与股价崩盘风险的关系研究中,少有同时参考两类代理成本,选取两个中介变量进行效应分析.因此,本文选用2009-2017年A股上市公司数据,引入过度投资与现金分红,对直:接控股股东持股与股价崩盘风险的关系进行研究.研究结果表明,高比例直接控股股东持股对股价崩盘|风险具有降低作用,同时,过度投资和现金分红在二者之间发挥了部分中介效应.进一步研究发现:过|度投资的中介效应解释度大于现金分红,二者多表现为一种并列关系,在管理层持股比例较低和股权制|衡度较低时,更容易发挥中介效应.

In research of relationship between controlling shareholder’s shareholding and stock price crash risk,there are less attention on two kinds agency cost and more than one medial variant.Using the data of A-Stock listed companies from 2009 to 2017,the paper focuses on medial effect of over-investment and cash dividends to the relationship between controlling shareholder’s shareholding and stock price crash risk.The results demonstrate,higher the controlling shareholder’s shareholding,lower the stock price crash risk.Meantime,over-investment and cash dividends play roles.Further,medial effect of over-investment shows better explanation than cash dividends.Meanwhile,the two medial variants exist parallel relationship and show more effect under the lower proportion of management shareholding and lower equity balance degree.