债权人监督与上市公司盈余管理——基于债务违约风险视角

Creditor Supervision and Earnings Management of Listed Companies:From the Perspective of Debt Default Risks

利用KMV模型计算出的债务违约风险衡量债权人监督动力,利用2008—2018年A股上市公司的数据,研究了债务违约风险与应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理的关系。研究发现:上市公司债务违约风险越高,其应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理水平越低;相比于国有企业,债权人外部监督对民营企业两种盈余管理的抑制作用更加显著。进一步研究发现:债权人监督能够降低上市公司通过操纵真实盈余管理向下调整利润的程度。

This paper makes use of the debt default risks calculated with KMV model to measure the creditors' supervisory power.Then it uses the data of A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2018 to study the relationship between debt default risk and accrued earnings management and real earnings management.The findings show that the higher the debt default risk of a listed company,the lower its level of accrual earnings management and real earnings management will becompared with state-owned enterprises,the external supervision of creditors has a more significant restraining effect on the two types of earnings management of private enterprises.Further research finds that creditor supervision can reduce the degree of downward profit adjustment by manipulating real earnings management in listed companies.