“无意之罪” 何以归责?——哲学与精神分析论域下的“无意识意愿”及其伦理意蕴

How Is “Involuntary/Unconscious Sin” Imputable?

从古希腊以来,行为的自愿性或有意性便被视为道德归责的依据,而经过基督教哲学对意志及其自由决断的探讨,人的道德主体性开始被明确奠基于自由意志之上。在此过程中,作为相关理论学说的试金石,并非出于自觉的意愿而导致的罪过即“无意之罪”的问题一再以不同形式被提出。无论是亚里士多德对于“不能自制”问题的分析,还是奥古斯丁对于情感最初波动之罪的考察,实际上都对意愿或意志活动的无意识维度及其伦理意蕴进行了揭示。时至现代,作为精神分析创立者的弗洛伊德通过对“无意识”的系统探究,深化了对于意志问题及其复杂性的理解,并正面勾勒出了某种“无意识意愿”的雏形。在此基础上,拉康在驳斥对欲望的自然主义解读并赋予欲望以特定伦理内涵的同时,也通过重新界定欲望、意志与理性的关系,并构想一种自愿为他者揽责而实现的自由,从而实现了对西方传统的哲学心理学与伦理观的创造性重构。

Since ancient Greece, voluntary or intentional behavior has been regarded as the basis of moral imputation, and through the discussion of will and its liberum arbitrium in Christian philosophy, human moral subjectivity has been explicitly based on free will. As a touchstone of related theories, the problem of sins that are not caused by conscious intentions, namely “involuntary sins”, has been raised in different forms. In modern times, Freud deepened his understanding of the problem of will and outlined the prototype of a kind of “unconscious will”. On this basis, while refuting the naturalistic interpretation of desire and giving it a specific ethical connotation, Lacan realizes a creative reconstruction of Western traditional philosophical psychology and ethics by redefining the relationship between desire, will and reason.