官员更替对经济增长的影响及其作用机制——来自地级行政区的经验证据

Effects of Leadership Turnovers on Economic Growth and the Underlying Mechanism——Evidence from Prefectural-Level Jurisdictions

本文利用1995—2016年地级面板数据,分析官员更替对经济增长的影响。实证结果表明,地级行政区党委书记更替会导致GDP增长率下降0.4个百分点。进一步分析发现,发生于年初的官员更替对经济增长的负面影响较弱;离任官员获得晋升有助于降低此负面影响,落马则会放大此效应;若官员更替导致增长目标的提出者和执行者不同,会降低目标的完成度。此外,政府主官转任党委主官的惯例安排和县域行政区的相对独立性可以在一定程度上缓解该负面影响。

This paper employs 1995—2016 prefectural-level panel data and analyzes the effects of leadership turnovers on economic growth.Empirical findings imply that turnovers of prefectural party secretaries would lead to a decrease of 0.4 percentage points in GDP growth rate.Further analyses reveal that the negative effects would be weakened if turnovers occur at the beginning of the year or leaving officers are getting promoted,and worsen if the leaving officers are getting arrested.The GDP growth targets will be more likely to be under-accomplished if the turnover leads to a separation of local leaders between target-setters and target-implementors.In addition,we find that the conventional practices of promoting ex-mayors to party secretaries and the relative independence of counties under the administration of prefectural cities serve as buffering mechanisms against the negative effects of turnovers.