产学研合作中专利侵权与防护的演化博弈分析

Analysis of Evolutionary Game of Patent Infringement and Protection in Industry-University-Research Cooperation

专利的侵权与防护是产学研合作成功的重要要素。通过对产学研短期合作中无惩戒与有惩戒机制、长期合作中的预期收益三种情况进行演化博弈分析,探讨了不同情形下演化均衡及相关要素。研究发现:企业的策略与其侵权的净收益、惩罚成本、长期合作的预期收益有关,而学研方的策略由防护收益与防护成本的大小决定;提高专利防护收益,降低防护成本,是有效激励学研方进行专利防护的重要手段;设计合理的专利侵权惩罚制度、签订完备的专利保护契约、加大信誉关系治理,是有效抑制企业侵权的重要举措;提高长期合作的预期收益是抑制企业侵权行为的有效机制。在此基础上,提出有效促进产学研合作的政策建议。

Patent infringement and protection is an important factor for the success of industry-university-research cooperation.Based on the evolutionary game,analyzes the three situations of no punishment,punishment mechanism and expected benefits from long-term cooperation among industry,university and research institute and,Discussing the evolutionary equilibrium and related elements in different situations are discussed.The results are as follows:(1)the strategy of the enterprise is related to the net profit of infringement,the penalty cost of payment and the expected benefits of longterm cooperation,while the strategy of university and research institute is determined by the protection profit and the protection cost;(2)improving patent protection benefits and reducing protection costs is an important means to effectively motivate university and research institute to carry out patent protection;(3)Designing a reasonable punishment system for patent infringement,signing a complete patent protection agreement and strengthening the governance of reputation relationship are important measures to effectively curb the infringement of enterprises;(4)Improve the expected benefits of long-term cooperation is an effective mechanism for restraining enterprise infringement.Based on this,the paper put forward effective policy recommendations to promote industry-university-research cooperation.