政府创新补助的激励扭曲效应——基于我国上市公司研发操纵行为的检验

Incentive Distortion Effect of Government Innovation Subsidy——Based on the Research and Development Manipulation Behavior of Listed Companies in China

选取2007~2017年A股上市公司作为研究对象,实证检验公司通过研发操纵获取政府创新补助的行为。研究结果显示,公司前一期的研发操纵程度越大,其在后一期所获得的创新补助越多。进一步研究发现,公司内部控制水平的提高能够显著降低研发操纵获取的创新补助,而所在地的法制环境作用不明显。

This paper selects A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2017 as the objects to empirically test their behaviors of obtaining government innovation subsidies by R&D manipulation.Result shows that the greater the degree of R&D manipulation in the previous phase,the greater the innovation subsidy in the later phase.Furthermore,it shows that the improvement of the company’s internal control level can significantly reduce the innovation subsidies obtained by R&D manipulation,while the role of local legal environment is not obvious.