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至善论的自由主义如何回应公共理性的批评? 被引量:4

How Perfectionist Liberalism Responds to the Challenge from Public Reason?
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摘要 自由主义既可以被看作是一种旨在推行个人自主的良善生活观念的至善论主张,也可以基于公共理性的理念被理解为一种试图在所有良善生活观念间保持中立的主张。公共理性的理念之所以反对至善论的解释,是因为它认为个人自主只是人们可以选择的诸多生活方式中的一种,不是所有合理公民都会认可的公共理由,因此不应该成为自由主义的道德基础。然而,通过描述一种更加包容的个人自主的生活方式,可以表明公共理性的理念也同样预设了这种良善生活观念,它对至善论自由主义的批评最终是无效的。 Liberalism can be understood either as a perfectionist theory that dedicates to a specific conception of good life,i.e.personal autonomy,or as a neutral theory that aims to be impartial with respect to diverse conceptions of good life adopted by reasonable citizens.The paradigm of the latter case is the ideal of public reason.This article explores the exact meaning of personal autonomy,and argues that even the ideal of public reason also presupposes such a conception of good life.So it follows that liberalism is a perfectionist theory based on the conception of personal autonomy.
作者 惠春寿 HUI Chunshou(Department of Philosophy East China Normal University,Shanghai 200241)
出处 《中国人民大学学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2020年第1期97-104,共8页 Journal of Renmin University of China
基金 国家社会科学基金项目“当代政治哲学中的公共理性与至善论之争研究”(17BZX018)
关键词 自由主义 至善论 公共理性 个人自主 中立性 Liberalism Perfectionism Public reason Personal autonomy Moralautonomy
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