“修昔底德陷阱”还是“艾利森陷阱”？——兼论中国的应对之策

Thucydides’s Trap or Allison’s Trap?

格雷厄姆·艾利森在描述当前中美关系时引入"修昔底德陷阱"概念,把雅典与斯巴达间的战争归因于新兴大国对守成国的挑战,由此推论日益崛起的中国与居于全球领导地位的美国爆发战争是大概率事件。然而,仔细研读修昔底德《伯罗奔尼撒战争史》对双方战争的叙述,会发现将雅典与斯巴达类比中国与美国,有明显的削足适履之嫌。"修昔底德陷阱"实质上是艾利森对修昔底德的误读,一定程度上误导了国际舆论,从而形成了一种新的认知陷阱--"艾利森陷阱"。其谬误在于:伯罗奔尼撒战争爆发的真正原因不是雅典力量的壮大,而是雅典的过度扩张政策和实践;权力格局变化不是战争爆发的唯一决定性因素;中美之间和雅典斯巴达之间也不具有相似性。伯罗奔尼撒战争对中美外交的启示在于:坚持和平崛起;妥善处理守成国面对崛起国的恐惧。

Graham Allison introduced the concept of Thucydides’ s Trap to describe the current Sino-US relations and attributed the war between Athens and Sparta to the challenge of the emerging power against the established power, thus inferring that the outbreak of war between the rising China and US as the leader in the world is a high probability event. However, looking back to Thucydides’ s description of the war between the two sides in the History of the Peloponnesian War, it seems that the analogy between the two sides would be inappropriate to apply to the prediction of Sino-US relations. The Thucydides’ s Trap is essentially a misunderstanding of Thucydides by Allison, which misleads international public opinion to a certain extent, thus forming a new cognitive trap – the Allison’s Trap, to interpret pessimistically Sino-US relations. The fallacies are: the Peloponnesian War was caused by the overexpansion of Athens, instead of its rise;the contrasting pattern of powers is not the decisive factor in the outbreak of war;the relationship of China and the United States can’t be compared with that of Athens and Sparta. Therefore, the enlightenments of the History of the Peloponnesian War on China’s diplomatic strategy toward the United States lie in: persisting in the peaceful rise and avoiding excessive expansion;properly handling the fear of the defending country in the face of a rising country.