地方政府债务治理的演进逻辑与转型路径——兼论中国地方政府债务融资之谜

The Evolvement Logic and Transition Path of Local Government Debt Governance: The Mystery of China’s Local Government Debt Financing

文章试图对中国地方政府债务治理的演进逻辑和转型路径提供一个逻辑自洽的理论解释,揭开长期困扰学界的中国地方政府债务融资之谜。文章认为,中国能够有效调动地方政府表外融资努力,且在传统预算软约束的体制环境中避免危机触发,是由于制度禀赋赋予中国特有的协调行动和政策试验等大国治理能力,其他理论思潮发展的"危机崩溃论"或"功能财政论",都不适于解读新时代地方政府债务治理的战略取向。为矫正传统模式隐含的制度性错配扭曲,新时代债务治理亟需从"激励导向"转型为"绩效导向",实施提质增效目标引领的项目甄别和绩效审计,从供给侧继续释放改革红利,促进实体经济高质量发展。

This paper provides a logically self-consistency theoretical explanation for the evolvement logic and transition path of local government debt governance in China, and uncovers the mystery of China’s local government debt financing which has long puzzled the academic circles. Because institutional endowments endow China with special governance capacity such as coordinated action and policy tests, a study argues that China can effectively mobilize off-balance sheet financing efforts of local governments, and avoid crisis triggering in the traditional budget soft constraint system. Other theoretical thoughts such as the "crisis collapse theory" and the "functional finance theory" are not suitable to interpret the strategic orientation of local government debt governance in the new era. In order to rectify the mismatch distortions implied in the traditional model, debt governance in the new era urgently needs to transform from "incentive-oriented" to "performance-oriented", implement project discrimination and performance audit guided by the goal of improving quality and efficiency, continue to release reform dividends from the supply side, and promote the high-quality development of the real economy.