期刊文献+

政府率规制对再制造竞争的影响 被引量:4

Impact of rate regulation from government on remanufacturing competition
下载PDF
导出
摘要 为了解决原制造商和第三方再制造商在政府率规制下的再制造市场竞争问题,运用动态模型分析了市场稳定状态下影响政府率规制的关键因素。研究了不同率规制下再制造产量、原制造商与第三方再制造商的再制造积极性和利润变化等问题。研究表明,率规制受到企业有效回收率和消费者价格感知的影响;政府率规制越严格,原制造商越会选择降低新产品产量来减少回收再制造责任;政府率规制越严格,对市场中再制造产品的刺激效果越弱,且会抑制第三方再制造企业的生产积极性;原制造商的再制造利润始终随政府率规制的升高而增大;原制造商的再制造利润始终随消费者价格感知的提高而减小;第三方再制造商的再制造利润随政府率规制的提高先减小后增大。在政府率规制相同的情况下,第三方再制造商的再制造利润随消费者价格感知值的提高而增大。 By considering the competition in remanufacturing market under the government regulation between original manufacturer and third party remanufacturer,a dynamic model to analyze the key factors affecting the government's rate regulation under stable market was studied.The problems such as remanufacturing production,remanufacturing enthusiasm of original manufacturers and third party remanufacturers,and profit changes under different rate regulations were studied.The research showed that the rate regulation was affected by the effective recycling rate of companies and the perception of consumer prices.If the government regulation became stringent,the original manufacturer would decrease the new product manufacturing to reduce the recycling obligation;the more stringent the government regulation was,the weaker the incentive effect on remanufactured products in the market,which would inhibit the production enthusiasm of third-party remanufacturers at the same time.The original manufacturer's remanufacturing profits was increased as the government's rate increased and was decreased as the perceived value of consumer prices increased.The profits of third-party remanufacturer decreased first and then increased with the increasing in the government regulation.Under the same government regulation,the remanufactured profits of the third-party remanufacturer increased with the increasing in the perceived value of consumer prices.
作者 陈信同 李帮义 王哲 魏杉汀 CHEN Xintong;LI Bangyi;WANG Zhe;WEI Shanting(College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 210016, China)
出处 《计算机集成制造系统》 EI CSCD 北大核心 2020年第2期522-530,共9页 Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems
关键词 政府 率规制 再制造 竞争 原制造商 第三方再制造商 动态模型 government rate regulation remanufacturing competition original equipment manufacturer third party remanufacturer dynamic model
  • 相关文献

参考文献7

二级参考文献64

  • 1周海云,杜纲,安彤.回收条例约束下双渠道营销闭环供应链的决策与协调[J].北京理工大学学报(社会科学版),2014,16(5):65-70. 被引量:1
  • 2顾巧论,高铁杠,石连栓.基于博弈论的逆向供应链定价策略分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2005,25(3):20-25. 被引量:208
  • 3刘彦平.逆向物流与闭环供应链管理问题研究[J].南京社会科学,2006(5):28-32. 被引量:25
  • 4黄祖庆,达庆利.直线型再制造供应链决策结构的效率分析[J].管理科学学报,2006,9(4):51-57. 被引量:133
  • 5Guide V D R, Harrison T P, Wassenhove L N V. The challenge of closed-hoop supply chain [ J ]. Interface, 2003,33 (6) :3-6.
  • 6Blackburn J D, Guide V D R, Souza G C. Reverse supply chain for commercial return [ J ]. California Management Review, 2004,46 ( 2 ) : 6 -22.
  • 7Nunen J A E E V ,Zuidwijk R O. E-enabled closed-loop supply chain [J]. California Management Review, 2004,46 ( 2 ) :40-54.
  • 8Flappper S D P, Nunen J A E E, Wassenhove L N V. Managing closed-loop supply chains [M].Berlin : Springer Verlag, 2004.
  • 9Savaskan R C, Van Wassenhove. Strategic decentralization of reverse channels and price discrimination through buyback payments [ R ]. Math center working paper series. Evanston, IL: Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern Univercity, 2000.
  • 10Hammond D, Beullens P. Closed-loop supply chain network equilibrium under legislation [ J ]. European Journal of Operational Research,2007,183(2) :895-908.

共引文献156

同被引文献56

引证文献4

二级引证文献4

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部