基于攻击图的电网信息物理融合系统风险定量评估

Quantitative risk assessment for cyber physical power system based on attack graph

由于信息和通信技术的广泛应用,现代电网已成为一个实时感知、动态控制与信息服务的多维异构复杂系统,即电网信息物理融合系统(电网CPS)。信息系统与电力系统的深度融合使得电网面临更多的网络威胁。在此背景下,本文提出了虚假数据注入攻击下的电网信息物理融合系统风险定量评估方法。针对攻击建立了数据流传递的电力信息安全模型,将攻击分为两个过程:首先选择变电站注入虚假数据,然后基于通信拓扑图构建了流传递路径,采用攻击图量化攻击源信息传递模型,并基于故障下最优负荷削减策略对电力系统潜在后果进行了定量评估。最后通过算例研究,确定考虑网络攻击因素下系统的薄弱节点,验证了所提方法的可行性和有效性。

Due to the wide application of information and communication technology,the modern power grid has become a multi-dimensional heterogeneous complex system with real-time perception,dynamic control and information service,namely cyber physical power system( CPPS). Under the background of the deep integration of cyber system and power system,the power grid faces more network threats. In this context,a quantitative risk assessment method of grid cyber physical system under false data injection attack was proposed in this paper. Against the attack a power information security model for data flow delivery is established,which divides the attack into two processes,firstly,selecting the substation to inject false data,then,the flow path is constructed based on the communication topology graph and using the attack graph to quantify the attack source information transfer model. In addition,the potential consequences of the power system are quantitatively evaluated based on the optimal load reduction strategy under failure. Finally,the weak nodes of the system were determined considering the factor of cyber-attack through the case study,which verifies the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed method.