基于委托代理理论的碳排放政府规制分析

Analysis of Carbon Emissions Regulation by Government Based on Principal-agent Theory

碳排放治理中会出现市场失灵现象,因此政府需积极干预,以更好地发挥市场配置功能。政府可以通过罚款、提供补贴等方式对碳排放企业进行规制。本文构建了一个政府部门与碳排放企业之间的"委托-代理"模型,分别在信息完全与信息不完全条件下,分析了政府对碳排放企业进行规制的最优激励合约问题。本研究认为,如果政府能够观测到企业的努力程度,帕累托最优时企业无需承担风险,政府仅需提供一定的补贴,使企业的收益正好等于企业的保留收益加上企业减排的成本即可;如果政府无法观测到企业的努力程度,则政府部门需要求企业签订一份激励合约,依据企业减排成果向企业提供补贴。

The governance of carbon emissions will appear the phenomenon of market failure, so the government should actively intervene, in order to better play to the market allocation function. The government can regulate carbon emissions through fines, subsidies and other ways. This paper built a "entrust-agent" model between government department and carbon emissions enterprises, then analyses the government regulation of carbon enterprise about optimal incentive contracts under the condition of complete information and incomplete information. Research suggests that if the government could observe the effort level of the enterprise, the Pareto Optimality doesn’t take a risk on enterprise, and the government only provide a certain amount of subsidy, exactly equal to the profitability of enterprises enterprise of retained earnings plus the cost of emissions. If the government cannot observe the effort level of the enterprise, the government department needs to require the enterprise to sign an incentive contract to provide subsidies to the enterprise based on the results of emission reduction.