亚里士多德论灵魂的多部分与统一性

Aristotle on the Division and Unity of the Soul

亚里士多德批评柏拉图对灵魂部分的划分,他认为灵魂的各部分在空间上不可分,仅在定义上可分。"灵魂在定义上可分"指的是各个部分的定义不包含彼此,因此,灵魂仅有三个真正的部分:营养、感知和理性。然而,灵魂的多部分如何构成统一体对于亚里士多德是一个迫切的问题,因为任何一个生物体的灵魂都是单一的形式。《论灵魂》第二卷第三章解释说灵魂的统一性是由于"低级部分潜在地存在于高级部分之中"。本文指出这个解释是不清晰的,灵魂的统一性辩护另有两种可能:一种是在亚里士多德之后的传统中发展起来的"虚拟潜在性"概念,另一种是亚里士多德将生命活动作为整体目的的论证。

Aristotle divides the soul into different parts according to various life functions.A given part of the soul is not spatially separate from other parts but rather only definitionally,meaning that the definition of each part neither refers to nor is referred to by other parts.Therefore,the soul divides into three parts:the nutritive,the perceptive,and the rational.However,given that the soul of any living being is a single form,how the parts of soul constitute a unity remains a crucial problem for Aristotle.De Anima III.2 claims that the unity of the soul is achieved because the lower part exists potentially in the higher part,e.g.,the nutritive part exists potentially in the perceptive part.This paper argues that this explanation is too brief to make sense,and that there are two alternatives for defending Aristotle's notion of the unity of the soul:one is the concept of virtual potentiality developed in medieval philosophy,and the other is Aristotle's own argument for treating the living creature as a single end,and as a whole.