去杠杆对企业融资风险的影响——董事网络特征的调节作用

Impact of deleveraging on financing risk of enterprises:Regulating role of directors’ network characteristics

长期而言,去杠杆有利于防范过高杠杆率引发的经济金融风险,但短期内,将导致中国非金融企业面临变强的融资约束,以及债务到期的偿还压力导致企业出现短期"阵痛"。董事网络有利于企业之间的信息交流和资源共享,能对短期内融资规模缩减引发的融资风险起到一定"缓冲"作用。选取2013-2017年沪深A股主板上市公司为样本,并对比分析国有企业和民营企业样本,实证检验了去杠杆与企业融资风险的关系,以及董事网络特征的调节作用。研究表明:董事网络规模、中心度以及结构洞丰富度的提高,将会抑制去杠杆引起的企业融资风险,且这一抑制作用在民营企业中更为显著。

In the long term,deleveraging helps to prevent the economic and financial risks caused by excessive leverage.However,in the short run,deleveraging will cause certain financing constraints for non-financial enterprises in China.At the same time,the debt repaying pressure would give rise to short-term "pain" in enterprises to cover the debt.The directors’ network would help information communication and resource sharing among enterprises,and can play a certain "buffer" role in financing risks caused by the reduction of financing scale in the short term.This paper chooses the listed companies issuing A-share on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Markets as the research samples from 2013 to 2017,and compares the state-owned and private enterprises.The experiment verified the relationship between deleveraging and corporate financing risk,and analyzed the regulating role of directors’ network characteristics.The result shows that the increase of scale,centrality and structural hole richness of directors’ network will restrain corporate financing risk resulting from deleveraging,and this inhibition effect is more obvious among private enterprises.