省级财政竞争对企业投资区位选择的影响——基于空间策略互动分析

Influence of Provincial Financial Competition on Enterprises’ Investment Location Choice: Interactive Analysis Based on Spatial Strategy

在财政分权与行政集权背景下,地方政府拥有提高辖区发展利益的激励,其有效途径是财政竞争。资本作为一种流动要素是经济社会发展的重要基础,地方政府通过减轻宏观税负和增加财政支出水平可以影响企业投资区位选择。使用数理模型研究了地方政府财政竞争对企业投资区位选择影响的性质以及政府间财政竞争策略互动的关系,运用空间杜宾模型对省级政府财政的性质和有效形式进行了检验和分析。结果表明吸引企业投资区位选择的省级政府税收竞争具有策略替代性而财政支出竞争具有策略互补性,税收竞争在地理距离权重矩阵最显著而财政支出竞争在地理邻域权重矩阵最显著。

Under the background of fiscal decentralization and administrative centralization,the local government has the incentive to improve the development interests of its jurisdiction and the effective way is fiscal competition.As a kind of flow factor,capital is an important foundation of economic and social development,and it is of practical significance for local governments to influence enterprises’investment location choice and attract them to settle in by reducing the macro tax burden and increasing the level of financial expenditure.By using the mathematical model,this study explores the nature of the influence of local government financial competition on enterprises’investment location choice and the interaction relationship between government financial competition strategies,and then tests and analyzes the nature and effective form of provincial government finance by adopting spatial Doberman model.The results show that the provincial government tax competition that attracts enterprises’investment location choice has strategic substitution while the financial expenditure competition has strategic complementarity,and that tax competition is the most significant in geographical distance weight matrix while financial expenditure competition is the most significant in geographical neighborhood weight matrix.