摘要
随着企业间的竞争越来越激烈,若想获取优势,提高市场占有率,企业就需要投入研发成本进行技术创新。而高管作为企业的代理人拥有企业战略决策权,对企业的研发投入和绩效起着关键作用。为了有效解决所有人目标与代理人目标不一致问题,就需要对高管进行一定的激励措施。文中以软件与信息技术行业为研究样本,选取了2014—2017年的数据,采用了描述性统计、相关性检验以及回归分析等多种分析方法,对高管激励、企业绩效和研发投入三者之间的相互关系以及高管激励对研发投入与企业绩效两者的调节作用进行回归检验,研究结果表明:高管短期薪酬激励和高管长期持股比例对研发投入与企业绩效的关系均不存在调节作用;研发投入强度与企业绩效负相关,且相关性不显著。文中从高管激励的视角出发,探究如何完善适合企业自身发展的高管激励制度,从而促进企业创新,对于培养软件和信息技术服务业的核心竞争力,提高企业绩效具有一定的指导意义。
As the competition among enterprises becomes more and more fierce,enterprises need to invest more in research and development for technological innovation if they want to gain advantages and increase market share.As the agent of the enterprise,the executive has the strategic decision-making power,which plays a key role in the R&D investment and performance of the enterprise.In order to effectively solve the problem of inconsistency between the goal of the owners and the goal of the agent,it is necessary to give certain incentives to the executives.This paper took the software and information technology industry as the research object,selected the data from 2014 to 2017,and adopted various analytical methods such as descriptive statistics,correlation test and regression analysiso regulate the relationship between executive incentives,corporate performance and R&D investment,and the role of executive incentives in adjusting R&D investment and corporate performance was tested.The results show that the short-term salary incentives of executives and the long-term shareholding ratio of executives do not affect the relationship between R&D investment and firm performance.There is a regulation effect;the intensity of R&D investment is negatively correlated with corporate performance,and the correlation is not significant.From the perspective of executive incentives,this paper explored how to improve the executive incentive system suitable for the company’s own development,thus promoting enterprise innovation,which has certain guiding significance for cultivating the core competitiveness of software and information technology service industry and improving enterprise performance.
作者
王秋菲
徐昕
秦爽
WANG Qiu-fei;XU Xin;QIN Shuang(School of Management,Shenyang Jianzhu University,Shenyang 110168,China)
出处
《技术与创新管理》
2020年第2期178-188,共11页
Technology and Innovation Management
基金
教育部文人社科项目“基于CAS理论的城市废弃物资源化共生网络脆弱性及治理机制研究”(18YJC790167)
关键词
高管持股
高管薪酬
研发投入
企业绩效
executives holding shares
executive compensation
R&D investment
corporate performance