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零担运输企业竞争合作博弈分析 被引量:1

Coopetition game analysis on less-than-truckload(LTL) transport enterprises
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摘要 竞争合作已成为当今经济发展的大趋势。以零担运输企业之间竞争合作为研究对象,分两阶段建立了价格竞争博弈模型和运输运作合作博弈模型,分析了零担运输企业竞争合作机制演变的动态过程。结果表明,零担运输企业在价格博弈时,合理竞争有利于提高收益,集中定价也能提高收益但存在对方背叛的风险因素;零担运输企业能否在运作上合作主要依赖于双方合作协调和信息处理成本的大小、合作运输成本节约值的大小等因素,而且服务水平越高的零担运输企业更倾向于运作方面的合作。从合作发展策略上看,合作更有利于零担运输企业市场的扩大和高服务水平零担运输企业规模的扩张。 Coopetition has become a trend in today s economic development.This paper targeted coopetition among LTL(less-than-truckload)transport enterprises,established the price competition game model and transport operation cooperation game model in two stages and analyzed the dynamic evolution process of competition and cooperation mechanism.Results show that when duopoly LTL enterprises make price game,reasonable competition and joint pricing strategy are conducive to boosting earnings,but the latter is at the risk of betrayal.Whether LTL transport enterprises can cooperate with each other in operation mainly depends on values of some cost factors,such as cooperation coordination and information processing costs of both sides,and saving value of cooperation transportation cost,etc.Moreover,the LTL transport enterprise whose service level is higher,is more inclined to cooperate in operation.In terms of cooperative development strategy,cooperation is more conducive to market expansion of LTL transport enterprises and scale expansion of LTL transport enterprise sat high service level.
作者 刘云霞 LIU Yunxia(School of Economics and Management,Zhejiang University of Science and Technology,Hangzhou 310023,Zhejiang,China;Department of Mechanical and Electrical Engineering,Xinjiang Institute of Technology,Akesu 843000,Xinjiang,China)
出处 《浙江科技学院学报》 CAS 2020年第1期71-75,80,共6页 Journal of Zhejiang University of Science and Technology
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(71201134) 浙江省教育厅科研计划项目(Y201635633)
关键词 公路运输 竞争合作 演化博弈 零担 复制动态 highway transportation coopetition evolutionary game less-than-truckload(LTL) replicator dynamics
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