不对称信息下输电电价政府监管演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Government Regulation for Transmission Price under Asymmetric Information

运用演化博弈理论,针对输电电价监管中信息不对称问题,构建了政府和电网企业输电电价监管演化博弈模型,分析了政府监管成功率、电网企业“合理利润”比例、政府处罚力度和公众监督概率对政府和电网企业输电电价监管演化稳定均衡的影响,并在此基础上通过数据分析了政府和电网企业初始状态对演化稳定均衡的影响。研究表明,电网企业演化稳定策略为申报真实成本,政府监管策略与政府主动监管成本和被动监管成本相对大小有关,政府和电网企业初始状态不会影响演化稳定均衡结果;为了促使电网企业申报真实成本,政府监管的成功率、电网企业“合理利润”比例、政府处罚力度和第三方监督概率存在最大值或最小值。

By using evolutionary game theory,the transmission price regulation evolution game model between governments and grid enterprises under asymmetric information is constructed to disclose the governments'and grid enterprises'evolutionary stable equilibrium strategies.The success rate of government regulation,the“reasonable profit”ratio of the grid companies,the level of government penalties and the effect of the probability of public monitoring on the governments'and grid enterprises'evolutionary stable equilibrium strategies are further analyzed.Based on these,the simulation analysis is carried out to analyze the influence of the initial state of the government and the grid enterprises on the equilibrium of evolution and stability.Results show that the grid enterprise evolutionary stable equilibrium strategy is to declare the real cost;the government regulation strategy is related to the government's cost of active regulation and passive regulation;the initial state of the government and grid companies will not affect the evolutionary stable equilibrium results.In order to encourage the grid enterprises to declare the real cost,there is a maximum or minimum value of the success rate of government regulation,the proportion of“reasonable profit”,the level of government penalties,the probabilities of third-party monitoring.