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管理层权力、企业并购与薪酬差距激励效应研究 被引量:1

The Impact of Corporate M&A Behavior on the Incentive Effect of Pay Gap: An Empirical Study Based on Management Power Theory
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摘要 本文深入分析在管理层权力的作用下公司高管通过并购行为影响薪酬差距激励效应的具体机制及经济后果。以2009至2015年我国沪深A股非金融类公司7878个观测值为研究对象,运用Stata15和多元回归方法进行实证研究。研究结果表明,上市公司高管运用权力,通过企业并购攫取超额收益,从而使得权力性薪酬差距削弱其正向激励效应。进一步地,将研究总样本按产权性质划分后再次进行检验发现,相较于民营企业,这种权力寻租的机会主义行为在国有企业中更为显著。本研究结论为我国上市公司特别是国有上市公司制定高效的薪酬契约与并购决策提供理论依据和建设性指导。 This paper deeply analyzes the specific mechanism and economic consequences of the influence of the executives’ influence on the compensation gap through the M&A behavior under the influence of management power,and the establishment of the company to supervise and restrict the management. The actual effect of internal and external governance mechanisms. The 7878 observed values of a-share non-financial companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2009 to 2015 were studied,and Stata 15 and multiple regression methods for empirical research were used.The research results show that the executives of listed companies use power to obtain excess returns through mergers and acquisitions,thus making the power compensation gap weaken its positive incentive effect. Further,the study of the total sample according to the nature of property rights and then test again found that compared to private enterprises,this power-seeking opportunistic behavior is more prominent in state-owned enterprises. Further research found that by adding the pay gap and the internal and external governance variables of the intersection test,it is found that the proportion of independent directors in the board of directors of state-owned listed companies and government intervention in the case of the failure of the compensation contract can be used for management rent-seeking behavior. The conclusion of this study provides theoretical basis for the formulation of efficient compensation contract,M&A decision and perfect internal and external governance for listed companies in China,especially state-owned listed companies, thus effective supervision and control are achieved.
作者 佟爱琴 任梓铭 郝雨桐 黄禁 TONG Ai-qin;REN Zi-ming;HAO Yu-tong;HUANG Jin(School of Economics and Management,Tongji University,Shanghai 200092,China)
出处 《山东青年政治学院学报》 2020年第2期100-109,共10页 Journal of Shandong Youth University of Political Science
基金 国家社科基金项目“公司治理、管理层权力与薪酬差距激励效应研究”(17BGL078)。
关键词 管理层权力 企业并购 薪酬差距 激励效应 management power merger and acquisition of enterprises the pay gap incentive effect
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