董事职务期前解除的立场选择与规则重构

The System of Dismissal of Directors:Choice of Position and Restructure of Rules

董事职务期前解除规则涉及董事会的功能与结构,更涉及股东权力与公司治理等诸多面向。最高人民法院于2019年4月发布《关于适用〈中华人民共和国公司法〉若干问题的规定(五)》,以“委托关系”定性为理论基础,明确了董事职务期前解除的无因立场。从比较法和学理分析来看,仅仅通过委托关系这一教义学归类,不足以证立股东(大)会对董事享有当然的任意解除权;以任意解除权和委托人权利不受授权约束为特征的委托关系定性,不但未必适于精确描述我国公司法的立法规定,也可能会影响董事会职能的切实发挥。由于股权结构、董事可问责度和衡平司法救济发达程度等差异,在美国特拉华州能够平衡股东与管理层冲突的无因解除规则,却可能在我国加剧股东之间的利益冲突。无论采取何种解除规则,我国公司法目前亟需对包括解除事由和程序、司法解除董事职务等在内的法律漏洞进行填补。

The rules on the dismissal of directors involve not only the function and structure of the board of directors,but also many other issues,such as shareholder power and corporate governance.The Supreme People’s Court of China released the Provisions(V)on Several Issues concerning the Application of the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China on April 28,2019.Taking the nature of the delegate relationship as its theoretical basis,this judicial interpretation makes it clear that a corporation may by a majority resolution remove its directors without cause.However,from the perspectives of comparative law and theoretical analysis,just by the dogmatic categorization of the the relation of principle and agent,is not sufficient to justify the right of shareholders’(large)committee to the directors’arbitrary termination,and characterized by the right of arbitrary rescission and the right of the principal not subject to authorization,the qualitative of the relation of principle and agent not only is incompatible with provisions of the Chinese Company Law,but also adversely affects the function of board of directors.Unlike its counterparts in the U.S,especially the state of Delaware,the rules on the dismissal of directors without cause would make the conflict between shareholders even worse in China.Moreover,with regard to dismissal of directors,the Chinese Company Law still has lots of other loopholes to close.