自身意识的疑难:海德堡学派、心灵哲学与现象学

The Problem of Self-consciousness:The Heidelberg School,Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology

以迪尔特·亨利希为代表的海德堡学派提出了“自身意识的问题”,并对关于自身意识的反思理论作了批评。在面对分析的心灵哲学中的高阶表征理论与一阶自身表征理论时,这些批评彰显了其理论效力。在构建自身意识的理论模型时,我们要避免陷入海德堡学派所批评的反思理论。在现象学的传统中,我们通过对意识的时间结构、具身性,以及这两个方面的相互交织的现象学分析,能够有效回应海德堡学派的批评,从而提供一条研究自身意识的哲学进路。

The Heidelberg School,inaugurated by Dieter Henrich,raises the“problem of self-consciousness”and criticizes the reflection theory of self-consciousness.This paper examines four theoretical positions concerning self-consciousness,namely,the higher-order theories,the self-representational theory,the Heidelberg School’s attitude,and the phenomenological approach.The first two of these positions fall prey to the Heidelberg School’s criticism;meanwhile,the self-luminosity model of self-consciousness advanced by the phenomenologist Dan Zahavi is a good approach to follow.Alert to the Heidelberg School’s criticism during the construction,in the phenomenological tradition,of the theoretical model of self-consciousness,a phenomenological access to self-consciousness emerges out of an analysis based on the phenomenology of inner time-consciousness,embodiment and the intertwining of these two aspects.