官员晋升压力、管理者过度自信与国企投资效率

Official Promotion Pressure,Manager Overconfidence and Investment Efficiency of State-Owned Enterprises

本文以2017~2018年国有上市公司为研究对象,就官员晋升压力与管理者过度自信对国企投资效率的影响进行了探讨。结果表明:官员通过政治权力干预国企经营并导致非效率投资;管理者过度自信使高管高估收益、低估风险而出现非效率投资;当两者共同发挥作用时,国企非效率投资问题更为严重。因此,各级政府要进一步简政放权,完善干部绩效考核机制,继续推进国有资产管理体制改革;国企自身则需进一步健全决策机制,优化股权结构,完善内部控制机制。

This paper makes use of the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share market from 2017 to 2018 to discuss the influence of officials’promotion pressure and managers’overconfidence on the investment efficiency of local state-owned enterprises.The results show that in order to achieve political promotion,local officials intervene in the operation of local state-owned enterprises by exercising their political power and lead to inefficient investment in local state-owned enterprises.Managers’overconfidence leads to inefficient investment by executives of listed companies when they make investment decisions.When both are in common,they overestimate returns and underestimate risks.The problem of inefficient investment of state-owned enterprises will become more serious when they play a role together.Therefore,governments at all levels need to streamline administration and decentralization,improve the performance appraisal mechanism of officials,and continue to promote the reform of the state-owned assets management system.The state-owned enterprises need to improve the decision-making mechanism,optimize the ownership structure and improve the internal control mechanism.