非正式制度、市场化进程与政府补贴——来自中国A股上市公司的经验证据

Informal Institution,Marketization and Government Subsidy:Empirical Evidence from A-Share Listed Companies in China

政治关联作为一种重要的非正式制度,会扭曲政府补贴这一稀缺资源的配置,而市场化进程作为一个正式制度不断建设和完善的过程,能够优化资源配置。针对上述问题,基于中国A股上市公司2008—2017年的数据,进行了计量分析。研究发现:(1)政治关联度越高的企业,得到的政府补贴越多。即政治关联度高的企业,会运用自身的政治资源来争取更多的政府补贴,而且政府的自由裁量权,会将补贴分配给政治关联度高的企业,从而扭曲了资源配置。(2)企业所在地的市场化程度,减弱了企业政治关联度对政府补贴的正向影响。基于上述研究结论,建议应避免政治关联这种非正式制度给政府补贴资源配置所带来的扭曲,继续推动市场化进程,促进正式制度不断完善,最终优化政府补贴资源的配置。

Political connection,serving as an important informal institution,will cause distortion of the allocation of government subsidies as scarce resources.However,the process of marketization with the continuous construction and improvement of a formal institution,can optimize such allocation.In view of the above-mentioned issue,the data of Chinese A-share listed companies during the years from 2008 to 2017 is used to conduct the quantitative analysis.The research finds the following conclusions.Firstly,companies with more political connections enjoy more government subsidies.That is to say,companies with more political connections will take the advantage of their political resources to get more government subsidies.Moreover,the government's discretion will allocate subsidies to the companies with more political connections,which thereby causes the distortion of resource allocation.Secondly,the degree of marketization of the company's location weakens the positive impact of political connection on government subsidies.Based on the above research conclusion,it is suggested that we should avoid distortions of allocation of government subsides caused by informal institution like political connection,continue to promote the process of marketization,promote the continuous improvement of the formal institution and finally optimize the allocation of government subsidy resources.