考虑过度自信行为的煤矿安全监管演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Coal Mine Safety Supervision Based on Overconfidence Behavior

针对煤矿安全监管存在的问题,构建考虑煤矿安全事故发生率和煤矿企业过度自信行为的演化博弈模型,得到不同情形下演化系统所达到的均衡状态,以此探讨过度自信行为和安全事故发生率对煤矿企业与政府监管部门行为的影响机理。研究结果表明:煤矿企业的过度自信行为和安全事故发生率对政府监管部门与煤矿企业的安全监管策略的演化稳定有显著影响。此外,安全投入成本、安全监管成本及罚款等因素对安全监管的演化稳定策略也有一定影响。最后进行了演化博弈的数值模拟,验证了调节参数对行为演化的影响。本文为煤矿安全监管提供了理论支持。

For the problems existing in coal mine safety supervision,an evolutionary game model considering the occurrence rate of coal mine safety accidents and the overconfidence behavior of coal mine enterprises is constructed,and the equilibrium state of the evolutionary system under different circumstances is obtained,so as to explore the influence of overconfidence behavior and accident occurrence rate on the behavior of coal mine enterprises and government supervision departments.The results show that the level of managers’overconfidence has a significant impact on the evolution and stability of the safety supervision strategies of government supervision departments and coal mining enterprises.In addition,the factors such as safety input cost,safety supervision cost and penalty also have some influence on the evolution and stabilization strategy of safety supervision.Finally,the numerical simulation of evolutionary game is carried out to verify the effect of adjustment parameters on behavior evolution.This paper provides theoretical support for coal mine safety supervision.