摘要
新一轮党和国家机构改革是推进国家治理体系和治理能力现代化的重大举措,此次改革主要集中于横向部门间的业务整合优化,但对于不同层级政府间的关系调整并未涉及。当前,大多数省、自治区实行的是以“市管县”体制和“省直管县”体制混合存在但以前者为主的组织体系。基于G省的案例分析表明,由于市级政权拥有对县级政权的人事任免权、促进经济增长的规则设置权、过程监督权和结果评价权,导致“省直管县”体制“有名无实”,省、市、县三级政权之间呈现出一种非完整性“委托—代理”关系。这种情况强化了市级不同任期主要领导经济增长决策的个人化特征,凸显市对县的“攫取之手”功能,弱化了县一级经济发展的自主性。因此,有必要根据新时代区域特征和发展目标差异,重新审视“市管县”和“省直管县”体制的利弊及其适用条件,进一步理顺省—市—县关系,为国家垂直治理体系改革和治理能力现代化提供决策支撑。
The new round of Party and state institutional reform is a major measure to promote the modernization of the national governance system and governance capabilities.This reform mainly focuses on the optimization of business integration among horizontal departments,but the adjustment of relations among different levels of government is not involved.At present,most provinces and autonomous regions implement a mixed organizational system of"city in charge of county"and"province directly in charge of county".The system of"city in charge of county"is the primary form.Based on the case analysis of G Province,it shows that the municipal government has the right to appoint and remove the personnel of the county-level government,the right to set up rules to promote economic growth,the right to supervise the process and the right to evaluate the results,which results in the system of"province directly in charge of county"with no real name,and there is an incomplete"entrust-agent"relationship among the provincial,municipal and county-level governments.This situation strengthens the individualized characteristics of the economic growth decision-making of the main leaders in different terms of office at the municipal level,highlights the"grabbing hand"function of the city to the county,and weakens the autonomy of the economic development at the county level.Therefore,it is necessary to reexamine the advantages and disadvantages of the system of"city in charge of county"and"province directly in charge of county"and its applicable conditions according to the differences of regional characteristics and development goals in the new era,further rationalize the relationship between province,city and county,and provide decision support for the reform of national vertical governance system and the modernization of governance capacity.
作者
田雄
李永乐
Tian Xiong;Li Yongle
出处
《中州学刊》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第2期63-70,共8页
Academic Journal of Zhongzhou
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究西部和边疆地区项目“西部乡村产业振兴中的政府、企业与农户互动关系研究”(19XJC840003)
陕西省社科界重大理论与现实问题研究项目“陕西乡村产业扶贫中的政企协同机制与影响研究”(2019Z026)
江苏高校“青蓝工程”优秀青年骨干教师项目。
关键词
经济增长
“省直管县”体制
“市管县”体制
非完整性“委托—代理”
国家垂直治理体系
economic growth
"city in charge of county"system
"province directly in charge of county"system
incomplete"entrust-agent"
national vertical governance system