上市公司大股东股权质押是否损害了中小投资者利益?

Does Major Shareholders’ Equity Pledge of Listed Companies Damage the Interests of Minority Investors?

我国股权质押和中小投资者保护目前仍存在制度性缺陷,因此大股东常常利用股权质押制度缝隙掏空上市公司,这不但损害公司和投资者利益,同时也扰乱资本市场的正常运行,成为我国资本市场健康发展路上的"绊脚石"。从我国上市公司大股东股权质押入手,分别探讨了股权质押是否会增加大股东掏空动机,国家法律和公司内部监管两方面如何影响大股东掏空行为,以及最终对公司价值产生的影响。通过实证研究后发现,股权质押会增加大股东掏空上市公司的概率,但法律和公司内部监管均与掏空呈显著负相关,即法律和内部监管会对大股东掏空上市公司产生抑制效果,从而达到有效保护中小投资者利益的目的。为大股东股权质押及投资者利益保护提供新的研究变量,同时也为监管部门规范股权质押业务和投资者利益保护提出相关建议。

As there still exist institutional defects in current equity pledge and protection of minority investors in China, major shareholders constantly tunnel listed companies by using such defects, which not only damages the interests of these companies and investors, but also upsets normal running and hinders healthy development of the capital market in China. This paper starts with the pledge of major shareholders’ equity in China’s listed companies, and discusses respectively whether it can increase tunneling motivation of major shareholders, the ways national laws and company’s internal supervision affecting their tunneling behaviors, and ultimate impacts on company value. The empirical research shows equity pledge will increase the probability of major shareholders’ tunneling of listed companies, while both national laws and company’s internal supervision has significant negative correlation with the above, i.e., a restraining effect on tunneling,which can effectively protect the interests of minority investors. The research also provides new research variables for major shareholders’ equity pledge and the protection of investors’ interests. It further suggests regulatory authorities to standardize the equity pledge and investor interest protection.