创业投资引导基金补偿机制对创投机构网络位置的影响研究

The Impact of the Compensation Mechanism of GVCGFs on VC Firms’Network Position

随着创投市场的网络化趋势越来越突出,提升网络位置成为创投机构的重要竞争战略之一。论文基于激励视角研究创业投资引导基金(简称引导基金)补偿机制对创投机构网络位置的影响。通过私募通数据库搜集大样本数据构造匹配样本,使用双重差分模型,研究结论表明:(1)引导基金参股时为私人资本提供收益补偿、固定收益补偿、或者收益补偿加上固定收益补偿会提升创投机构的网络位置,为私人资本提供亏损补偿、亏损补偿加上固定收益补偿、或者亏损补偿加上收益补偿加上固定收益补偿则不会提升创投机构的网络位置;(2)相比于参股国有背景创投机构而言,引导基金参股非国有背景创投机构时提供收益补偿、固定收益补偿、或者收益补偿加上固定收益补偿对网络位置的提升作用更明显。论文拓宽了创投机构提升网络位置的战略选择,对引导基金主管部门选择补偿机制也有一定的参考意义。

Networking has become an increasing trend in China’s venture capital(VC)market,and promoting the network position may be an important way for venture capital firms to achieve competitive advantage.Based on the theoretical perspective of incentives,the impact of compensation mechanism of China’s Government Venture Capital Guiding Funds(GVCGFs)on VC firms’network position is investigated in the paper.These VC firms are funded by the government and act as limited partners to commit in VC funds.By constructing a large matching sample from the PEdata database and using a difference-in-differences model,it is found that the equity participation of GVCGFs may promote VC firms’network positions if they provide the private capital with revenue compensation,fixed-revenue compensation,or revenue compensation plus fixed-revenue compensation,but may not if there is loss compensation,loss compensation plus fixed-revenue compensation,or loss compensation plus revenue compensation plus fixed-revenue compensation.It is also found that the network position promoting effects are more significant for GVCGFs participating in non-state-backed VC firms than for those participating in state-backed ones.These results support the incentive hypothesis,expand our understanding of the government VCs and VC network,and support some recommendations for the GVCGFs’authorities to choose the compensation mechanism as well as a feasible strategy for VC firms to enhance their network position.