考虑政府补贴和风险规避的绿色供应链决策模型

Green Supply Chain Decision Model Considering Government Subsidy and Risk Aversion

本文通过构建政府与由一个制造商和零售商组成的二级绿色供应链间的三阶段及两阶段博弈模型,探究政府补贴及供应链成员风险规避的影响。结果显示适度的政府补贴对最优决策及相关收益有正向影响;分散决策下的任何风险规避情境及集中决策下的同时风险规避情境中,风险规避可以提升产品绿色度、降低零售价格和增进社会福利;分散决策下,批发价格随制造商风险规避度上升而下降,随零售商风险规避度上升而上升,最优政府补贴系数变化与之相反;当双方同时风险规避时,风险规避对供应链效用有不利影响;当一方为风险中性时,分散决策下另一方风险规避度上升会增加供应链效用,集中决策下则对决策和收益无影响。集中决策相较分散决策会产生更有利结果。

Through establishing three-stage and two-stage game models between the government and a two-stage green supply chain that consists of one manufacturer and one retailer,this paper analyzes the effects of the government subsidy and the supply chain members’risk aversion.Results show that an appropriate government subsidy has a positive effect on the optimal decisions and related benefits.In any situation of risk aversion under decentralized decision-making and the situation of simultaneous risk aversion under centralized decision-making,risk aversion helps improve product greenness,reduce retail price,and improve social welfare.Under decentralized decision-making,the wholesale price decreases when the level of manufacturer’s risk aversion increases,but it increases when the level of retailer’s risk aversion increases.Contrary to the wholesale price,the optimal government subsidy coefficient behaves oppositely.When both members are risk-averse,the utility of the supply chain decreases with the level of risk aversion.When one member is risk-aversion,the other member’s level of risk aversion has a positive effect on the utility of the supply chain under decentralized decision-making,but has no effect on the optimal decisions and the related benefits under centralized decision-making.Centralized decision-making brings more favorable results decentralized decision-making does.