需求信息非对称下基于商业信用的双目标激励契约

Double-Objective Trade Credit Contracts under Demand Information Asymmetry

市场需求信息和零售商的销售努力水平均为零售商的私有信息时,制造商如何甄别真实市场信息并对零售商销售努力有效激励,是保证供应链商业信用有效运作的关键问题。本文构建基于商业信用契约的双目标激励模型,推导出商业信用激励契约的最优配置;进一步分析了市场规模等参数对激励契约和供应链成员、系统收益的影响;并探讨了信息缺乏程度对制造商所付出代理成本的影响。研究表明:制造商通过设计合理的商业信用激励契约,既能诱使零售商披露其真实需求信息并激励其付出足够的销售努力,也可获得尽可能多的供应链收益。

We consider a supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer,where the manufacturer offers trade credit for the retailer.We explore how the manufacturer designs optimal trade credit contracts when the retailer hides its selling effort level and the market demand information.We construct and solve double-objective incentive models and obtain the optimal trade credit contract parameters.We also analyze the effects of the market size on the optimal incentive contract parameters and the supply chain’s profits.And we further discuss the influence of the lack degree of information on the agency cost paid by the manufacturer.The research shows that trade credit contracts designed reasonably by the manufacturer could motivate the retailer to reveal real information and inspire the retailer to exert enough efforts,as well as ensure the manufacturer to obtain as much benefits as possible.