零售商主导的模糊供应链博弈——考虑销售努力的情形

Stackelberg Game Considering Selling Effort in Supply Chain Led by Retailers in Fuzzy Environment

以包含一个制造商与一个零售商的两级供应链为研究对象,考虑零售商居于主导地位并付出销售努力时供应链各成员的决策.结合经济环境的不确定性,将市场需求函数和制造商的制造成本、零售商的经营成本视为模糊变量;运用斯塔克尔伯格模型刻画零售商和制造商之间的博弈过程,并引入期望值模型、机会约束模型来解决最优决策问题;通过一个数值算例证明了供应链博弈模型的有效性.研究表明,在均衡结果中,考虑到零售商所承担的销售努力成本,其总体期望值利润相比于制造商而言偏低,但单位产品边际利润较高.原因在于,零售商的主导地位使其不仅通过销售努力提高产品销量,提高了供应链的整体利润,同时也能够采用压低批发价格的方式,使自身在供应链中获取更多收益.

A two-echelon supply chain including one manufacturer and one retailer is considered in this paper.In the supply chain,the retailer plays a dominant role.In order to increase sales,selling effort is made.This paper supposes the retailer provides selling effort and bears the costs by itself.Considering the uncertainty of economic environment,the market demand function is supposed to be linear with price and selling effort,and to be fuzzy variables with the same as the manufacturer’s producing cost and retailer’s operating costs.Stackelberg model is employed to solve the game problem between the manufacturer and the retailer.As well as the expected value model,the chance constrained model is employed to solve the optimal decision problem.To illustrate the effectiveness of the supply chain game model,a numerical example is given in the end.The research shows that in the equilibrium,con-sidering the cost of retailer’s selling effort,the expected profit of retailer is lower than that of manufacturer,but the marginal profit of unit product is higher.The reason is that the dominant position of the retailer not only improves the sales volume of products through selling effort,but also the profits of the whole supply chain.Meanwhile,the retailer can lower wholesale price to make itself gain more profits in the supply chain.