基于三方演化博弈模型的精准扶贫主体行为研究

Research on the Subjective Behavior of Targeted Poverty Alleviation Based on the Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model

【目的/意义】政府、企业和贫困户是精准扶贫中最主要的三个利益相关者,他们的决策行为将直接影响到精准扶贫的成效。为更好地协调精准扶贫中各利益相关者的关系、制定精准扶贫的相关政策、提高精准扶贫的效率,【设计/方法】通过构建三方演化博弈模型,探讨了三者对精准扶贫决策行为的影响,并选取样本对模型进行模拟仿真检验。【结论/发现】数值结果表明,政府下拨的扶贫资金、企业参与扶贫获得的收益和贫困户积极脱贫所获得的报酬是影响三方博弈主体策略选择的重要因素。政府兜底扶贫资金对企业介入扶贫有正面的影响,容易使贫困户消极脱贫;企业参与扶贫所获收益会激励企业积极参与扶贫,并为贫困户创造就业机会而积极脱贫;贫困户积极脱贫获得的收入对政府行为影响较小,但会使企业的成本增加而不愿参与扶贫。因此,当政府下拨的扶贫资金规模适度,企业参与扶贫的收益回报可观,贫困户积极脱贫所获得的报酬适中时,可达到精准扶贫的帕累托最优状态。

[Purpose/Significance]The government,enterprises and poor households are the three main stakeholders in targeted poverty alleviation.Their decision-making behavior will directly affect the effectiveness of targeted poverty alleviation.The purpose of this article is to better coordinate the relationships among various stakeholders in targeted poverty alleviation,formulate related policies for targeted poverty alleviation,and improve the efficiency of targeted poverty alleviation,[Design/Methodology]This paper discusses the three-party evolutionary poverty alleviation by constructing a three-party evolutionary game model.The effect of decisionmaking behavior,and select samples to simulate the model.[Findings/Conclusions]The numerical results show that the government’s poverty alleviation funds,the profits of enterprises participating in poverty alleviation,and the rewards of poor households’active poverty alleviation are important factors affecting the strategic choice of the three-party game players.The government’s poverty alleviation funds have a positive impact on enterprises’involvement in poverty alleviation,and it is easy for poor households to get rid of poverty.The benefits of enterprises participating in poverty alleviation will encourage enterprises to actively participate in poverty alleviation and create employment opportunities for poor households to actively escape poverty.The income of poor households from active poverty alleviation has a small impact on government behavior,but it will increase the cost of enterprises and be reluctant to participate in poverty alleviation.Therefore,when the size of the poverty alleviation funds allocated by the government is moderate,the returns from the enterprises’participation in poverty alleviation are considerable,and the poor households’active poverty alleviation returns are moderate,and the Pareto optimal state of precision poverty alleviation can be achieved.