众包中基于博弈论的牛顿冷却定律应用

Application of Newton’s Law of Cooling Based on Game Theory in Crowdsourcing

众包是一种可以高效解决复杂且困难问题的方法,但工人的恶意攻击行为会严重阻碍该方法的高效应用。为此,基于博弈理论,提出一种新的时衰收益策略模型来防止用户的恶意攻击行为。将参与者之间的交互建模为重复囚徒困境博弈,分析众包过程中的恶意攻击问题;使用基于牛顿冷却定律的时衰收益策略模型动态调节博弈双方的收益,改变博弈的纳什均衡;最后,使用股息贴现模型证明该策略模型的正确性。研究结果表明,该方案提高了合作用户的比例,降低了网络用户提供服务的成本,促进了网络用户之间的合作,解决了工人的恶意攻击问题。

Crowdsourcing was a method to solve complex and difficult problems efficiently.However,the efficient application of the method was seriously hindered by the malicious attack of workers.Thus,A new time-failed revenue strategy model was proposed to prevent malicious attacks.Firstly,the interaction between participants was modeled as the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma(IPD)Game,in which a malicious attack was analyzed;Secondly,The Strategy of Income Decreased by Time(SIDT)model based on Newton’s Law of Cooling was used to dynamically adjust the returns of both players,thus the Nash equilibrium of the game was changed.Finally,the dividend discount model was used to prove the correctness of the strategy model.The proportion of cooperative was improved and the cost of providing services for network users was reduced,which can be seen from the research results.The cooperation rate between network users was promoted,and the problem of malicious attacks by workers was effectively solved.