年报问询函能否有效识别和抑制盈余管理

Can the Annual Report Inquiry Letter Effectively Identify and Mitigate Earnings Management of Listed Companies

近年来,交易所问询函在我国证券监管中发挥着愈发重要的作用。本文基于2014年至2017年沪深交易所发放的年报问询函,从事前和事后两个角度研究年报问询函能否有效识别和抑制上市公司盈余管理水平。研究结果表明:问询函能够有效识别和抑制上市公司的盈余管理水平,且当被问询年报为向上调整的盈余管理时,被问询后盈余管理水平显著降低。文章为中国现阶段监管方式创新性转型的实施效果提供了经验证据。

In recent years,the exchange inquiry letter has played an increasingly important role in China’s securities supervision.Based on the annual report inquiries issued by the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2014 to 2017,this paper examines whether the annual report inquiries can effectively identify and mitigate the earnings management level of listed companies.The research results show that the inquiry letter can effectively identify and suppress the earnings management level of listed companies,and when the annual report is the upward adjustment of earnings management,the level of earnings management after inquiry is significantly reduced.The article provides empirical evidence for the implementation of the innovative transformation of China’s current regulatory approach.