高管薪酬、会计信息透明度与审计收费——基于中国制造业上市公司的数据

Executive Compensation,Earnings Transparency and Audit Fees:Evidence from Listed Manufacturing Companies in China

选取2007-2017年中国制造业上市公司数据,以会计信息透明度为中介效应变量,从新视角研究了高管薪酬对审计收费产生的影响。研究结果表明:高管薪酬水平与审计收费呈正相关的关系,与会计信息透明度呈负相关的关系。在高管薪酬激励对审计收费的影响过程中,会计信息透明度起到了部分中介作用。并且这种影响机制在进行了相关稳健性检验后仍然存在。研究结论丰富了高管薪酬经济后果以及审计收费影响因素的相关研究。

Taking the listed manufacturing companies from 2007 to 2017 in China as samples,this paper studies the impact of executive compensation on audit fees and considers earnings transparency as a meditator variable from a new perspective.The results are as follows:the executive compensation is positively correlated with the audit fee;the executive compensation is negatively correlated with the earnings transparency;and earnings transparency plays a part of mediating effect in the impact of executive compensation on audit fee process.The results still hold after conducting relevant robustness tests.The conclusion of this paper expands the relevant research on both the economic consequences of executive compensation and the influential factors of audit fees.