降低社会保险费率能减轻企业缴费负担吗——基于中央强制和地方自发的双重检验

Does Decreasing Contribution Rate Reduce Social Insurance Burden?Tests based both on the Central Government’s Coercion and on the Local Governments’Discretion

利用地方政府贯彻中央要求和自发降低社会保险费率形成的两类自然实验识别政策效果。以A股上市公司为样本,采用DID、PSM-DID和合成控制等方法,考察2016年全国阶段性降低企业职工基本养老保险单位缴费比例、2013年上海自发降低城镇职工基本养老保险、基本医疗保险和失业保险费率两次政策冲击的效果。结果显示,企业缴费实际负担均未显著降低。建议明确减负目标、优化地方政府执行激励和强化企业缴费责任。

Using the two natural experiments,including the local governments lowering the contribution rates for the social insurance with and without the central government’s requirements,this paper identifies the policy effects.Taking all firms listed in China’s A-Stock Market as the sampl e and using DID,PSM-DID and Synthetic Control methods,this paper explores the effects of national firms’contribution rates for Endowment Insurance dropping periodically in 2016 and Shanghai provincial firms’contribution rates for Endowment Insurance,Medical Insurance and Unemployment Insurance dropping in 2013.The results show no significant reduction of firms’real contribution burdens.This paper suggests clear burden-reduction objectives,motivating the local governments to implement the policies from the central government and solid contribution obligations for firms.