银行信贷、非效率投资与僵尸企业——来自中国A股上市公司的经验证据

Bank Credit, Inefficient Investment and Zombie Enterprises-Empirical Evidence of Listed Companies in China

利用2009-2017年中国沪深A股上市公司数据,探究企业非效率投资与僵尸企业的关系,以及银行信贷对非效率投资与僵尸企业之间关系的影响。结果表明:企业的非效率投资与僵尸企业正相关,特别是企业过度投资中耗费的资源、形成的产能具有不可逆性,将直接增加经营风险和财务风险,导致企业沦为僵尸企业;银行信贷对企业僵尸化具有负向调节效应,相对于过度投资来说,银行信贷对于抑制投资不足导致的企业僵尸化问题更加有效;从贷款期限来看,短期贷款能够给债务企业形成流动性压力和再融资压力,迫使企业经理人提高投资效率,从而对企业僵尸化问题的调节效应更显著。

Using the data of China’s A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2017, this paper studies the relationship between inefficient investment and zombie enterprises, as well as the impact of bank credit on the relationship between inefficient investment and zombie enterprises. The empirical results show that the inefficient investment is positively correlated with zombie enterprises. In particular, the resources consumed and the production capacity formed in over-investment is irreversible, which directly increases the operational risk and financial risk, leading to the zombie companies. Bank credit has a negative regulating effect on the zombification of enterprises. Compared with over-investment, bank credit is more effective in curbing the enterprises’ zombification caused by under-investment. From the perspective of loan period, short-term loans can bring liquidity pressure and refinancing pressure to debt enterprises, and force enterprise managers to improve investment efficiency, as well as to have a more significant regulatory effect on the zombification of enterprises.