机构投资者调研与大股东掏空行为抑制

Institutional Investors'Corporate Site Visits and Its Effect on Restricting the Tunneling Behavior of Large Shareholders

本文基于大股东掏空问题以及机构投资者的治理作用,利用手工整理的机构投资者调研数据,实证考察了机构调研对大股东掏空行为的影响。结果表明,机构投资者调研能够有效抑制大股东对上市公司的掏空;并且,这种抑制作用在公司治理水平较低或有形资产比重较高时更加显著;进一步地,股权制衡和大股东对上市公司董监高的控制程度会显著地影响机构调研与大股东掏空的关系;此外,在考虑内生性问题以及替换大股东掏空的度量方法之后,研究结论依然稳健。本文的研究表明,机构投资者调研能够削弱大股东的信息优势,有效监督和约束其私利行为,保护中小投资者权益。

Based on the research question of large shareholders'tunneling behavior and the governance role of institutional investors,this paper empirically investigates the impact of institutional investors'corporate site visits on large shareholders'tunneling by using the hand-collected data of site visits.The results show that institutional investors'site visits can significantly restrict large shareholders'tunneling and this effect is more pronounced for firms with poor corporate governance or higher proportion of tangible assets.Further tests show that equity restriction and the degree of large shareholders'control over directors,supervisors and executives can significantly affect the relationship between site visits and tunneling.In addition,our research conclusions are still robust after considering the endogenous problem and using other measurement methods of tunneling.This study suggests that site visits can effectively weaken large shareholders'information superiority,supervise and restrain their private interests,and protect the rights and interests of minority shareholders.