金融杠杆、地方政府融资行为与城商行绩效——基于城市商业银行的面板门槛模型

Financial Leverage,Local Government Financing Behavior and City Commercial Bank Performance——Based on City Commercial Banks Panel Threshold Model

本文利用我国2007~2017年130家城商行的平衡面板数据,采用Hansen门槛估计方法对金融杠杆、地方政府融资行为与城商行绩效三者之间的关系进行实证分析,结果表明:(1)以地方政府融资行为为门槛变量,地方政府融资行为对城商行绩效的影响存在“双重门槛效应”;(2)当地方政府合理/不合理融资行为时,金融杠杆分别正向/负向调节地方政府融资行为与城商行绩效之间的门槛关系;(3)地方政府融资行为存在区域差异,大部分地方政府处在合理政府融资行为区间。

Based on the balance panel data of 130 city commercial banks in China from 2007 to 2017,this paper uses Hansen threshold estimation method to analyze the relationship among financial leverage,local government financing behavior and performance of city commercial banks.The results show that:(1)Regard local government financing behavior as the threshold variable,the effect of local government financing behavior on the performance of city commercial banks has a“double threshold effect”;(2)When the local government financing behavior is reasonable/unreasonable,the financial leverage positively/negatively regulates the threshold relationship between the local government financing behavior and the performance of city commercial banks;(3)There are regional differences in local government financing behavior,most local governments are in the reasonable range of government financing behavior.