股价崩盘风险、监督压力与非效率投资

Stock Price Collapse Risk,Supervision and Inefficiency Investment

本文以2006年至2017年的沪深A股上市公司为样本,研究股价崩盘风险以及叠加内外监管压力对公司非效率投资的影响机理。研究结果表明,股价崩盘风险上升,不仅会抑制公司过度投资行为,也能够改善公司投资不足行为。进一步的研究发现,股价崩盘风险对公司非效率投资的约束作用,在内部监督压力较高的公司更为显著,在外部监督压力较高的公司存在不确定性,表明当前以事后监督为主的外部监督机制存在一定的缺陷。本文得出的政策启示为,有效约束上市公司的非效率投资行为应采取强化公司内部治理结构和重构外部监督机制的政策工具。

This paper takes the A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2017 as a sample to study the risk of stock price collapse and the impact of internal and external regulatory pressures on the companies’inefficient investment.The results show that the rise of the risk of stock price collapse will not only inhibit the companies’excessive investment behavior but also improve the companies’under investment behavior.Further research finds that the constraint effect of stock price collapse risk on the companies’inefficient investment is more significant in companies with higher internal supervision pressure and that there is uncertainty in companies with higher external supervision pressure,indicating that the current external supervision mechanism based on post-supervision supervision has certain defects.The policy implications of this paper are that policy tools to strengthen the internal governance structure of the company and reconstruct the external supervision mechanism should be adopted to realize the effective restraint on the inefficient investment behavior of listed companies.