地方政府帮助地方银行改善经营绩效了吗?--基于“地方保护”和“行政干预”的视角

Do Local Governments Improve Regional Banks’ Performance?--Based on Local Protectionism and Local Government Intervention

本文检验了地方政府行为对地方银行经营绩效的影响,发现:(1)"地方保护"具有"保护之手"作用,"行政干预"具有"良性引导"作用,二者有利于降低地方银行的盈利波动性、提升地方银行的运营稳健性。(2)对于资产规模较小的银行、未设立省外分行的银行,"地方保护"和"行政干预"的积极影响较大;对于高技术产业投资比较活跃的地区,"地方保护"和"行政干预"的积极影响较大。(3)当省内经济增长率领先于全国水平时,"地方保护"和"行政干预"依然发挥积极作用;然而,当省内经济增长率落后于全国水平时,"地方保护"会产生"约束之手"作用,"行政干预"会产生"恶性引导"作用,二者反而会加剧地方银行的盈利波动性、降低地方银行的运营稳健性。

This paper explore the effect of local government’s behavior on regional banks’ performance. We get the conclusions that local protectionism and government intervene not only could reduce regional banks’ profit volatility, but also could enhance regional banks’ robustness. The lower the level of assets, the more the effects of local protectionism and government intervene on regional banks. For non-cross-regional banks, local protectionism and government intervene have higher impacts. The more active investment in high-tech industry, the more the effects of local protectionism and government intervene on regional banks. When the local economic growth rate is ahead of the national level, local protectionism and government intervene still play an active role, but when the local economic growth rate falls behind the national level, local protectionism and government intervene will increase regional banks’ profit volatility and reduce regional banks’ robustness.