地方官员更替与企业员工配置

Local Government Officials’ Turnover and Corporate Employee Allocation

文章以2005~2014年上市公司为样本,实证分析了地方官员更替对于辖区企业员工配置的影响。研究发现,地方官员变更显著影响当地企业员工配置,导致地方国有企业缩减雇员,民营企业增加雇员;新任官员为外部调任或政治冲击较大时,国有企业雇员缩减得更为明显;所在地区就业压力较大、投资规模缩减较多的民营企业更有动机在官员更替时增加雇员,而自身业绩较差的国有企业更有动机削减雇员。进一步分析表明,地方官员更替时,国有企业"瘦身"能够"减负""增效",民营企业增加雇员尽管增加了劳动力成本但并不会"减效",且能够获得更多的银行贷款和政府补贴。文章拓展了企业员工配置的理论研究,对于理解我国地方官员对企业员工配置的影响具有一定的价值。

This paper investigates the impacts of local officials’ turnover on corporate employee allocation by adopting a sample of listed companies from 2005 to 2014, using the turnover of Secretary of Municipal Committee to reflect local officials’ turnover. The results suggest that local officers’ turnover significantly influences firms’ employee allocation and may lead to the decrease of employment for local state-owned firms and the increase for private firms. The decrease is more significant when the successive secretary comes from outside or the shock is more dramatic. Private firms, located in regions with more severe employment pressure or experiencing severe investment decline, are prone to expand employment. Local state-owned firms with poorer performance would cut down more employees. Moreover, local state-owned firms may alleviate burden and promote productivity by decreasing employment, when confronted with officials’ turnover. For private firms, increasing employment does not damage productivity or financial performance by increasing labor cost, and they can reap the benefits of more loans and subsidies. This paper contributes to the work on firms’ employee allocation, and provides insights into the impacts of local politicians on employee allocation.